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I. INTRODUCTION
Arguments based on customary practices abound in legal discourse. 
Although most often associated with common law adjudication, custom
arguments are especially prominent in two other areas, constitutional law 
and international law. Constitutional law’s most famous invocation of 
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custom is probably Justice Felix Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, arguing that longstanding executive practices
can provide a “gloss” upon the Constitution’s grant of “executive Power.”1 
The most common form of modern unwritten international law is customary 
international law, which is said to rest upon the longstanding practices of
nations done out of sense of legal obligation.2 
This Article suggests, however, that even if one accepts the legal authority 
of custom, arguments from custom have less scope than is often supposed. 
In particular, many claims styled as appeals to custom do not rest on custom
alone and as a result require justification on the basis of authority other than 
(or in addition to) custom.  Legal appeals to customary practices take at
least two different forms, only one of which is properly termed purely an 
argument from custom.  As developed in subsequent Parts, one version
of argument from custom is that certain practices have been accepted in the
past and should be understood to establish law with respect to those
practices in the future.  The second version is that certain practices have 
been accepted in the past and should be understood as the basis for law
regarding other practices in the future, either because the other practices are 
(somewhat) analogous or because the prior practices support a general 
principle that can then be applied to new circumstances. 
My suggestion here is that only the first of these forms of argument is
purely an argument from custom.  Unlike the second form, it does not 
require contested value judgments to administer it (other than the initial 
judgment that custom itself should have legal force).3  The questions that
arise in its application are factual (is there evidence of a customary
practice?) or definitional (such as, must the practice be “unquestioned”?).4 
In contrast, the second form of argument necessarily involves value
judgments, not just with respect to the force of custom but also on the 
question whether a particular customary practice should be extended to a 
new circumstance.  Put another way, the first form of argument rests, as a
1. 343 U.S. 579, 611–12 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the 
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 418–23 (2012). 
2. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102(2) (1987).
3. See Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 
79–80 (2013), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/forvol126_lacroix.pdf 
(challenging the authority of custom and questioning whether “historical gloss is worth 
salvaging”).
4. On the latter point, see Frankfurter’s demanding standard of “a systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never
before questioned.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610. One might question whether this
formulation overstates the required showing.  See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 
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normative matter, only on the proposition that custom can or must be
binding; the second involves further normative determinations regarding 
the particular new circumstances at issue, external to the idea of custom
in the abstract. 
An objection may be made that these two forms of argument cannot
cleanly be separated into distinct categories.  No future event is exactly
like a past set of events. Thus, it may be said, all customary arguments
call for extensions of law from prior practices to different future practices.
That is, they all fall into what I have described as the second category of
argument. As explained below, this objection has elements of truth, 
such that the categories I have described are perhaps better understood 
as end points of a continuum than as two rigidly distinct classifications.
Nonetheless, the distinction remains useful because some arguments from 
custom contain a minimum of external value judgments whereas others 
contain substantial external value judgments.  My contention can thus more
precisely be rephrased to say that arguments containing more than a
minimum of external value judgments—or, perhaps, more than a minimum 
of contested external value judgments—are not merely arguments from 
custom.  They contain other situation-specific normative elements that
cannot be demonstrated solely by appeal to custom. 
Although customary arguments in the United States are most immediately 
associated with common law, the distinction I suggest here lacks direct
implications for common law argumentation and adjudication as we 
understand them today.  It is a commonplace that modern common law
reasoning has an element of external value judgment.  We routinely say
that common law judges “make” law by extending (or refusing to extend) a 
customary rule to new and arguably distinct circumstances.  Indeed, this
view of common law is so ordinary that it can safely be called the modern
common law process.  As David Strauss describes,
[W]hen the precedents are not clear, the judge will decide the case before her 
on the basis of her views about which decision will be more fair or is more in
keeping with good social policy.  This is a well-established aspect of the common
law: it is not simply a matter of following precedent.  There is a legitimate role
for judgments about things like fairness and social policy.5 
5. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 38 (2010). As Strauss quotes 
Benjamin Cardozo, “[W]hen [common law judges] are called upon to say how far
existing rules are to be extended or restricted, they must let the welfare of society fix the



































Thus, it may not be of much theoretical significance whether a common 
law argument rests on what I will call “pure custom” or whether it combines 
elements of custom and external value judgments (the latter being the 
common law process Professor Strauss describes).  Both types of argument 
are accepted within the core of common law reasoning. 
In contrast, in constitutional law and customary international law, the 
distinction between pure custom and contested extensions of custom has 
greater force.  Neither field so readily accepts that adjudicative 
decisionmakers have authority to “make” law on the basis of, in Strauss’s
words, “fairness and social policy.”6  To be sure, in both fields there are
academic arguments that law should be made in a common law fashion 
by extensions of custom; Strauss, for example, makes this argument
expressly with respect to constitutional law.7  But as discussed below, the
common law approach is problematic—or, at least, is more problematic
than arguments based on pure custom—in these fields because, unlike in
common law adjudication, it raises troublesome questions of authority.
To take the more obvious example of customary international law, it is
said that customary practices establish law between nations because, by
their practices, sovereigns consent to longstanding ways of acting.8 
International law adjudication, in this formulation, does not make law 
but rather finds it on the basis of past practice. To the extent sovereign
consent provides the authority for unwritten international law, arguments 
depending on extensions of custom lack this authority and must 
draw authority from some other less congenial source. 
6. See id. at 38. 
7. See id. at 1–5; see also  SIR  HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 37–47 (1958) (discussing the role 
of judge-created norms in international law). 
8. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 135 (June 27) (“[I]n international law there are no rules, other than
such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise . . . .”);
DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (2002) (“We take it as an 
article of faith that the modern law of nations derives its legitimacy from the consent of 
states.”); id. at 14 (“The doctrine of consent generally teaches that the common consent
of states voluntarily entering the international community gives international law its 
validity.  States—and presumably other international actors—are said to be bound by
international law because they have given their consent.”); Andrew T. Guzman, Against
Consent, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 747, 748 (2012) (“International Law is based on the consent
(express or implied) of states.” (quoting ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 4 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Louis Henkin, International Law:
Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 27 (1989) (“[A] State is not
subject to any external authority unless it has voluntarily consented to such authority.”); 
see also Guzman, supra, at 749 n.3 (citing additional authorities).  But see Guzman, 
supra, at 783–90 (noting problems of a consent-based international system and arguing
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Similarly, in constitutional law, arguments from custom may draw 
authority from the nation’s (or a branch’s) consent to (or acquiescence 
in) a practice manifested by longstanding acceptance of it, even if the 
practice is not consistent with the Constitution’s text.9 Again, to the extent 
an argument is based not upon pure custom but upon an extension of 
custom, the argument has changed the basis of its authority because it no 
longer arises solely from the discoverable fact of widespread historical
consent.  It instead arises from a normative judgment.  One may fairly then
ask, on what authority can it be based? 
These points have contemporary practical relevance.  Consider two 
apparently unrelated modern controversies: presidential war power and
secondary (aiding and abetting) liability for international human rights
violations.  In constitutional law, the President has claimed independent 
power to initiate low-level armed conflict, as reflected for example in the 
2011 intervention in Libya.10 That claim has been justified by the President 
mainly on grounds of custom.  Although some scholars argue that the 
Constitution’s original meaning grants this power,11 that view is not widely
accepted and in any event it is not the primary basis of the President’s
defense.  Rather, the President and academic defenders have generally relied 
on arguments from custom: whatever the Constitution’s original meaning, it
is said, a longstanding practice has emerged of the President engaging in
low-level hostilities without congressional authorization, and this common 
practice has acquired the force of law superseding the Constitution’s text.12 
In customary international law, a substantial modern debate concerns the 
extent to which foreign investors should be legally responsible for human
rights atrocities committed by the governments of countries in which they
do business.13  Plaintiffs have brought numerous suits in U.S. courts
9. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 432–38.  Bradley and Morrison suggest 
other reasons for the authority of custom, including most prominently the Burkean idea 
of wisdom in past practices.  See id. at 455–56. For purposes of this Article, Burkean
justifications appear subject to an assessment similar to consent-based justifications (namely,
that their appeal is much less persuasive for extensions that are justified by contested 
analogies).
10. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 (2011) [hereinafter 
2011 OLC Mem.].
11. E.g., JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 8 (2005). 
12. 2011 OLC Mem., supra note 10, at 6–9. 
13. Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human 










   













   
 
 
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)14 raising these sorts of claims. In 
one version of the analysis, it is argued that the investors’ actions violate 
a customary international law rule recognizing secondary liability for 
entities that aid and abet international law violations.15 
In the terms suggested by this Article, neither of these claims is an
argument from pure custom.  As explained below, it is doubtful that a 
specific custom exists of presidents unilaterally initiating the use of force 
in circumstances equivalent to the Libya intervention, and in any event, 
the President’s defense does not rest on such a claim.  Rather, the President’s
defense depends on extending custom by finding a general principle allowing
presidents to use low-level force without congressional authorization. 
The defense then applies that principle to validate the Libya intervention, 
even though the principle arises for the most part from distinct circumstances 
that do not present the same set of value judgments.  Similarly, there is 
no specific custom of secondary responsibility of commercial enterprises 
for human rights violations by the governments of nations in which they
do business.16  The argument for liability depends on the twin propositions 
that customary international law recognizes secondary responsibility in 
other circumstances such as wartime actions of individuals and that this 
principle should be applied to create secondary commercial responsibility
for business activities that indirectly assist governmental abuses.17 
To be clear, this Article does not contend that arguments for extension
of custom are illegitimate.  Instead, it makes two more limited claims.  First,
there is an important difference between arguments from pure custom
and arguments for the extension of custom, with the latter being more
properly called common law arguments.  Second, the legitimacy of
common law arguments in some fields, especially constitutional law and
international law, is substantially more problematic than the legitimacy
of arguments from pure custom. 
The Article develops as follows.  Part II sets out in greater detail the 
proposed distinction between arguments from pure custom and arguments 
for extension of custom.  Part III illustrates the distinction by reference 
to the constitutional debate over the President’s military intervention in 
Libya and to the customary international law debate over the secondary
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
15. Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS 
L.J. 61, 75–77 (2008). 
16. See 1 EXPERT LEGAL PANEL ON CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN INT’L CRIMES,
INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY: FACING 
THE FACTS AND CHARTING A LEGAL PATH 3 (2008) (noting “considerable confusion and 
uncertainty about the boundaries of [the concept of corporate complicity] and in particular 
when legal liability, both civil and criminal, could arise”).
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liability of multinational corporations. These Parts are intended to be 
only descriptive, to illustrate the need to reconsider the general category 
of arguments from custom.  Part IV then turns to normative considerations,
and in particular argues that questions of legitimacy are substantially different
for the two types of arguments described in the prior Parts: arguments from
pure custom have more secure legitimacy than arguments for the extension
of custom because the former but not the latter can be said to rest on general 
consent. This Part further argues that the concern is especially acute for 
customary international law because traditionally, customary international 
law grounds its legitimacy in consent.  Arguments not grounded in consent 
require a complete reformulation of the authority of customary international
law.  In contrast, the message for constitutional law is less certain because 
constitutional law is more conflicted regarding the theoretical source of its
legitimacy. 
II. PURE CUSTOM AND EXTENSIONS OF CUSTOM: GENERAL 
CONSIDERATIONS
A. Overview
This subpart develops my general claim that there are two types of 
legal arguments based on customary practices, only one of which is purely 
an argument from custom.  To begin, we should consider what constitutes
an argument from custom.  By arguments from custom, I mean claims
that past practices, whether within a society or across societies, establish 
law (or contribute to shaping law) that becomes binding without—and
even contrary to—positive written enactment.  I intend this definition to
be broad and nontechnical, recognizing that some might define customary
law more narrowly or precisely.18  I also leave aside questions about how
a potentially binding custom is established with respect to a particular 
practice, thus avoiding issues such as how long the practice must continue
and the extent to which it must be uncontested.19  I further assume that
claims based on custom can or should establish binding law, although that 
also might easily be disputed.  My purpose is to examine the structure of 
arguments from customary practices, not to say whether such arguments
should succeed. 
18. Cf. J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 449, 451–52 (2000) (taking a more technical view of custom). 




















   
    
 
 
To restate the general proposition sketched at the outset, my primary
claim is that there are two distinct forms of argument from custom. The
first form entails no contested external value judgment (that is, external 
to the general question of the binding nature of past practices).  It rests
upon past practices that are in all relevant respects equivalent to the present 
circumstance in which the asserted customary rule is to be applied.  This 
sort of argument involves only (a) a factual claim about what has been
done in the past and (b) a normative claim that, as a general proposition,
present conduct should be governed by past practices.20  In contrast, the
second form of argument from custom has three steps: (a) a factual claim 
about what has been done in the past; (b) a normative claim that, as a 
general proposition, present conduct should be governed by past practices; 
and (c) a further claim that, although no past practice exists with respect 
to the particular present conduct at issue, the present conduct is sufficiently 
similar to other past conduct that the rule indicated by custom for the past 
conduct should also be applied to the present conduct.
The immediate difficulty with this proposed dichotomy is that all
customary arguments, strictly speaking, take the second form.  No present 
practice is exactly like a past practice.  There will always be a question
whether there are relevant differences, and the affected person always may
claim there is some difference that justifies not applying the past practice
to the new case.
Although technically correct, this objection should not obscure the 
fact that there are two very different processes of argumentation at work. 
First consider the situation in which no one would think the factual 
differences carried normative weight.  It is true that in this case there are
strictly speaking the three steps to the argument outlined above, but
nothing turns on the third step—and indeed it will rarely even be
confronted—because there is no material disagreement. A decisionmaker,
evaluating the arguments, will not face a meaningful choice at the third 
step, and thus as a practical matter, the argument has only the two-step 
structure. Now consider a situation in which reasonable people will disagree 
on the normative weight of the factual differences.  A decisionmaker
evaluating the argument here, in contrast, will face a significant choice 
at the third step: even if there is substantial consensus on the first two 
steps, the ultimate decision will be sharply contested. 
20. To be clear, both of these inquiries may be problematic.  See LaCroix, supra
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B. Illustrations: Constitutional Law 
It will be useful to consider specific situations as illustrations. I begin 
with some examples from constitutional law—specifically foreign relations
law, because that is an area of sparse judicial decisionmaking where
appeals to nonjudicial custom have particular prominence—and then
turn to customary international law.  Although these fields of law are
different in many respects, I suggest that my description fits customary 
arguments in both areas. 
The Constitution’s Article II, Section 2 says that the President may
make treaties “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.” 
Assume that, as a matter of the Constitution’s original meaning, that 
section directs the President to consult with Senators throughout the 
negotiation process for their “Advice” and then to present the completed
treaty again for their “Consent.”  (I do not think this is what the original 
meaning requires21 but scholars have argued to the contrary,22 and it is
useful to assume it here for purposes of illustration.) In his initial
implementation of the treatymaking clause, President Washington consulted 
the Senate in the early stages of treaty negotiation to discuss the matter
with the Senators.23  Washington soon decided that this approach was 
inefficient and altered course.  Thereafter he did not consult the Senate
formally prior to signing treaties and instead submitted only the fully
negotiated treaty to the Senate for formal approval or disapproval.24 
Following Washington’s example, subsequent presidents uniformly signed
first and sought approval afterwards, rather than seeking advice along the 
way. The “Advice and Consent” function became in practice one of after-
the-fact consent only.25 
Further assume, as appears to be true, that presidents after Washington 
concluded many sorts of treaties in this way and that they did not conclude
21. MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 135–41 
(2007).
22. E.g., Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making
and Abrogation of Treaties—the Original Intent of the Framers of the Constitution
Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L. REV. 1, 133–35 (1979); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin
S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 
626–36 (2004); Howard R. Sklamberg, The Meaning of “Advice and Consent”: The
Senate’s Constitutional Role in Treatymaking, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 445, 446–47 (1997). 
23. RAMSEY, supra note 21, at 151–52. 
24. Id. at 152–54. 































treaties with formal advice throughout the process at all.  Then assume
two further hypothetical events occur: academic scholarship demonstrates, 
to the satisfaction of the relevant decisionmaker,26 that the clause’s original
meaning requires advice throughout the process, and the President 
negotiates a new treaty without continuous Senate advice.  Is a decisionmaker
justified in regarding the new treaty’s process as unconstitutional, or 
does custom establish the constitutionality of the President’s approach? 
I think as a practical matter we would say that the decisionmaker faces
only two questions.  The first is whether the facts establish a constitutional 
custom with respect to the way the President negotiates treaties (and this 
seems a fairly easy affirmative).  The second is whether a constitutional
custom of this strength should establish the Constitution’s modern meaning.
The second question is a difficult one, of course, but it is just a specific 
version of the general question whether past practices create rules for the 
future with respect to materially identical conduct.
It would presumably be the case, of course, that the hypothetical 
proposed treaty is not exactly like any past treaty. Perhaps, then, one 
could argue that the past practices of Senate nonparticipation should not 
establish rules for the new treaty.  But in the ordinary course it would be 
hard—impossible, I think—to identify any normatively relevant differences. 
If the past practice encompassed a wide variety of treaties, as we are
assuming it did, it is not likely that the present treaty is different, on any
scale that anyone would think normatively significant, from past treaties.27 
Of course the new treaty will differ in some ways, but these will not be 
ways that affect anyone’s views of how the Senate should be involved. 
Thus, we can say with great confidence that when past actors embraced
the custom of presidential treatymaking for prior treaties, they would
have embraced it for the present treaty as well.
Now consider a different example from the same field.  The Constitution’s 
text does not expressly identify any way the United States can enter into 
international agreements other than through Article II, Section 2’s
treatymaking clause (that is, with the advice and consent of two-thirds of 
the Senate). However, modern presidents have commonly entered into 
international agreements with the consent of a majority of both houses of
Congress (so-called congressional-executive agreements).28  As above,  
26. For purposes of this Article, it is irrelevant whether the decisionmaker is a 
judge or someone in the executive or legislative branch. 
27. One could imagine a wholly unprecedented sort of treaty for which a different
conclusion might be possible, such as a treaty ceding territory or putting the United States 
under the sovereignty of another nation.
28. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. 
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we will assume that (a) the practice is sufficient to show a custom that— 
if one credits customary arguments—could be a rule for future agreements;
(b) new research conclusively establishes that the Constitution’s original 
meaning does not permit congressional-executive agreements; and (c) the 
President enters into a new congressional-executive agreement.  Is the 
new agreement constitutional? 
At first this situation may seem parallel to the advice-and-consent 
argument described above.29  It may be that the evidence of custom is
somewhat less conclusive,30 but that is a question of what factual evidence
is required (step one in the framework above); thus, one might argue that 
in fact there is not a sufficient custom of congressional-executive
agreements to establish a rule overriding the text.  Step two should be the
same—either one regards customary practice as generative of legal rules
or not.  But here, unlike in the advice-and-consent situation, there is a
possibility of a third argument.  Assume, as is generally the case, that 
major past congressional-executive agreements have typically been trade 
or financial agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), and that other major nontrade agreements have been approved as
treaties.31  Suppose the new agreement is not a trade agreement; for 
example, suppose that the President decides to submit the proposed
Convention on the Law of the Sea32 as a congressional-executive
agreement, relying on the past practice of approving agreements by a
majority of Congress. 
At this point one could argue that the Law of the Sea agreement is not 
like the past agreements in all normatively relevant respects.  That is, its 
opponents could concede a custom of congressional-executive agreements 
on trade-related matters and concede that custom can generate legal
commitments (and even that custom has generated legal commitments 
29. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 468–75 (discussing historical practice
arguments in the context of congressional-executive agreements).
30. See id. 
31. Michael D. Ramsey, The Treaty and Its Rivals: International Agreement-Making 
in U.S. Law and Practice (forthcoming) (draft on file with author); Peter J. Spiro,
Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961, 962 
(2001).
32. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
The United States signed the treaty in 1994, but the Senate continues to withhold approval in
the face of conservative political opposition. See Kristina Wong & Sean Lengell, 






























with respect to trade agreements) and still plausibly argue that the Law 
of the Sea agreement must be approved as a treaty.33  Congress may be
thought to have particular constitutional authority in trade-related matters. 
Further, for tariff-related agreements such as NAFTA, Congress can
accomplish the substance of the agreement through reciprocal trade
legislation (legislation that lowers U.S. trade barriers conditional upon other
countries lowering theirs).  And Congress can override trade agreements 
through subsequent legislation, so they may not appear to involve substantial 
constraints on U.S. policymaking.  Thus, constitutional objections
to trade-related congressional-executive agreements may appear more
formalistic than substantive.34 The Law of the Sea agreement does not 
share these characteristics of trade agreements (or does not share them to 
the same extent).
As a result, one could not say, regarding the Law of the Sea agreement, 
that a customary consensus stood behind its approval as a congressional-
executive agreement.  Because plausibly relevant differences exist between 
the Law of the Sea agreement and the prior trade agreements, it is
possible that the customary consensus extends only to trade treaties and
not to the Law of the Sea agreement.  A decisionmaker who claimed a
broader prior consensus would be engaging in speculation.  Of course, a 
decisionmaker might say that in the decisionmaker’s assessment there is
no meaningful difference between trade agreements and the Law of the
Sea agreement, and thus, the latter could be approved as a congressional-
executive agreement.  But this conclusion must rest upon the decisionmaker’s 
own normative assessment, not upon the decisionmaker’s factual assessment 
of the prior consensus. In sum, equating trade agreements and the Law
of the Sea agreement, for purposes of the constitutional approval process, 
requires an additional normative assessment—not merely that custom
should generate legal commitments but also that legal commitments 
generated by custom should be extended to an arguably distinct situation.
In contrast, suppose the new proposed agreement is not the Law of the 
Sea agreement but a new free trade agreement with, say, Brazil.  Now
we are back to a two-step analysis—whether there is a custom of approving 
trade-related agreements by a majority of Congress and whether custom
can generate legal rules.  It will not do to argue that no prior trade agreement 
33. See Spiro, supra note 31, at 962–63 (making an argument for limiting
congressional-executive agreements in this manner); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?:
The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 
759–60 (2001) (same). 
34. See RAMSEY, supra note 21, at 216–17 (arguing for the unconstitutionality of 
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with Brazil has been approved by a mere majority of Congress.  Even 
though a trade agreement with Brazil is different in some sense from past
agreements with Mexico, Costa Rica, or Colombia, there is not a plausible
normative difference.  The decisionmaker, if satisfied on the first two
points, can say as to the third that there is no doubt that the prior consensus
embraces the Brazil agreement as well.  This is not the decisionmaker’s
assessment of the normative difference but the decisionmaker’s assessment of
the consensus assessment of the normative difference.  Hence in this 
case, but not in the Law of the Sea example, we can fairly say the
decisionmaker is finding, not making, law. 
Before turning to international law, I will consider a potential
counterargument. Perhaps one could claim that the customary practices 
with respect to prior specific events have customarily been understood to
establish a general rule. The general rule then might be applied to new 
analogous circumstances, even ones that are arguably normatively different, 
on the claim that the custom is not to recognize the possible normative 
differences.  To take the Law of the Sea agreement as an example, perhaps
one could argue that custom reflects a general rule of “interchangeability”35 
allowing (but not requiring) congressional-executive agreements in all 
cases.  Even if all the actual examples of prior congressional-executive 
agreements are trade agreements, perhaps that is only coincidence—it
might be the case that all the relevant actors over time have accepted the
general rule of interchangeability.  Under this argument, allowing the
Law of the Sea agreement to be approved by a mere congressional 
majority is not an extension of custom; it is an application of custom, but
of a custom agreed at a more generalized level.  Thus, this application 
does not require any external value judgment and is no different from the 
advice-and-consent example.36 
35. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 28, at 895–97; Oona A. Hathaway,
Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United
States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1355–57 (2008); Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties
and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments 
of National Policy (pt. 1), 54 YALE L.J. 181, 195–96 (1945). 
36. Put another way, one might ask whether customs establish merely practices, or
instead principles, and if the latter, at what level of generality we should characterize the 
principle for which a custom or a set of arguably related customs stands.  If practices are
taken to establish a principle at a high level of generality, they may be read to create a
rule that goes far beyond anything that has actually happened in practice.  But that is
exactly the point: without a close and specific tie to practices, one cannot say that there is 






   
   
 
   
 
    
 





   









I think this is a possible situation in theory, and I would not deny its
occasional existence in practice.  However, it seems difficult to demonstrate
in most cases.  Congressional-executive agreements are an example of 
the difficulty.  Although one could make the argument suggested above, 
it would seem difficult if not impossible to substantiate it. It is possible 
that people in the past accepted congressional trade agreements because 
they accepted a broader rule of interchangeability, but it is also possible 
that they accepted congressional trade agreements because they thought
Congress had a unique role in trade regulation that did not extend to 
international agreements generally.  Or, more likely, various people
expressed various positions, while others did not consciously adopt any 
particular explanation but merely accepted the immediate resolution for
reasons of immediate political interest.  Absent a very wide and unanimous
body of literature on the point, any generalization beyond the specific
practices appears to be no more than speculation. The arguments for
interchangeability seem more accurately characterized as normative
arguments for extending the specific custom regarding trade agreements
to international agreements generally. 
One may similarly object that in the advice-and-consent situation
considered earlier, we are abstracting from past practices a general rule
that consultation with the Senate is never required (just as we might 
attempt to abstract a general rule that interchangeability is always
permitted). The difference, though, is that there is a broad set of historical 
practices with respect to advice and consent that seems to cover almost
the full range of normative situations. Thus, for advice and consent, but
not interchangeability, customary convergence on a general rule is a 
plausible, nonspeculative conclusion.37 
C. Illustrations: International Law
Similar points can be made using international law examples showing
that this is not a claim merely about constitutional custom.  Consider the 
idea of head-of-state immunity.  Here it is said that under customary
practice, sitting heads of state cannot be subject to civil or criminal 
therefore, rest purely on the custom but rather is an extension.  On the other hand, if the 
practice is so comprehensive that a general principle can be identified without going 
beyond the plain implications of practice, that would seem to remain a matter of pure
custom. 
37. If advice-and-consent practice did not cover the full range of normative
situations or if an advice-and-consent issue arose in the context of a treaty that seemed
normatively different from all prior treaties, this response would not hold, and the 








    
 





   
 




   











[VOL. 50:  867, 2013] The Limits of Custom 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
adjudication in foreign nations with respect to their official or private 
acts.38  (A similar custom historically applied to diplomatic personnel,39 
although that rule is now codified by treaty.)40  Assume a sitting foreign 
head of state is prosecuted in U.S. court and claims this customary
international law immunity.  That would be plausibly characterized as an
argument from pure custom in two ways.  First, the defense likely could 
demonstrate that the act on which the prosecution is based, when
committed by a head of state, has customarily given rise to immunity.
True, the exact act presumably has not previously been committed and
therefore has not been subject to immunity, but it is likely that immunity
has been found for acts that are not normatively distinct (that is, acts that
no one would think could be normatively distinct).  Alternatively, perhaps
the defense could demonstrate that there is a customary practice stated
more generally that all head-of-state acts, regardless of description, give rise
to absolute immunity.  Thus, even if there are possible normative
distinctions between the present suit and prior ones, we can say with
confidence that the custom would disregard them.  As noted above, the 
latter argument is more difficult to prove, but head-of-state immunity is 
one area where it might well be demonstrable as a practical matter—it
appears that there is a very broad range of descriptive writings and official 
statements setting forth the custom at a general level.41  If that could be
demonstrated, regardless of the specific subject of the suit in question, 
custom seems to call for immunity.42 
38. SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 264–66 (2006); Ingrid
Wuerth, Pinochet’s Legacy Reassessed, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 731, 731–32 (2012). 
39. See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 696–98 (Béla Kapossy & Richard
Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758). 
40. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31, ¶ 1, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
41. See Wuerth, supra note 38, at 731–32. 
42. Note, however, that this claim is highly subject to the historical showing that
can be made with respect to head-of-state immunity.  Consider two variations, both
present in the leading U.S. case Ye v. Zemin. 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004).  First, does 
head-of-state immunity persist after the leader leaves office?  The court in Ye implicitly
found that it did, on the strength of an executive branch suggestion of immunity.  See id.
at 624–25. But as a matter of customary law, that conclusion should turn on the specific 
inquiry whether immunity has actually been accorded to former heads of state, not 
whether the rationale underlying sitting head-of-state immunity fairly encompasses 
former heads of state. Second, does head-of-state immunity extend to violations of jus 
cogens norms of international law?  The plaintiffs in Ye argued that it did not, but the 
court directly found to the contrary, also relying on the executive branch suggestion.  See




   





    
   
 
      
   
   
  













    
  
In contrast, consider a related but distinct claim of immunity.  Suppose 
a claim of absolute immunity from prosecution is made by a nation’s 
minister of foreign affairs, who is neither the head of state nor an accredited 
diplomat.43  Assume there is no specific custom with respect to ministers
of foreign affairs, the issue not having previously arisen.44  The minister’s
argument would be that a minister of foreign affairs is similarly situated 
to a head of state or diplomat. The basis of the custom of absolute 
immunity for the latter persons is to prevent disruption of peaceful
interactions among states, and (it is argued) that interest similarly
supports immunity for foreign ministers.  Thus, the minister attempts to
invoke a general rule that immunity should apply as necessary to prevent 
disruption of peaceful interactions among states.
This argument involves a contested extension of custom, not a pure
application of custom.  It is possible that the customary practices we can
observe with respect to heads of state and diplomats show a more general 
implicit agreement of states along the lines the minister suggests, but 
that seems only speculation.  Because immunity sharply conflicts with the 
attainment of justice, one might instead think that it should be applied
very narrowly and not be extended to new offices that are similar but
not normatively identical to those where it has already been recognized.
Immunity for foreign ministers may further the interest underlying head-
of-state immunity, but it is not essential to that interest and thus not 
normatively identical.  In the absence of actual specific practices or 
widespread theoretical agreement on foreign minister immunity, there is
whether immunity has historically been extended for such violations (or whether the
immunity was stated so broadly in the past that it necessarily would have been
understood to extend to such violations). 
On the latter point, see the exchange between Professors Wuerth and Dodge on the 
related issue of whether official act immunity (a distinct concept from head-of-state 
immunity) extends to jus cogens violations by lower level officials: William S. Dodge,
Guest Post: Official Act Immunity-Keeping the Questions Straight, OPINIO JURIS (May
13, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/05/13/guest-post-william-s-dodge-resp
onds-to-ingrid-weurth-on-samantar/; and Ingrid Wuerth, Guest Post: Immunity — 
Separation of Powers, Human Rights Cases, and Yousuf v. Samantar, OPINIO JURIS
(May 9, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/05/09/guest-post-immunity-separa 
tion-of-powers-human-rights-cases-and-yousuf-v-samantar/. 
43. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 
3, ¶ 1, at 6 (Feb. 14) (considering legality under customary international law of Belgium
issuing an arrest warrant for the Congo’s foreign minister).  I assume here that the 
minister could not invoke a more general immunity for official acts and that the
question—as in the Arrest Warrant case, see id. ¶ 50, at 20—is whether the minister has
absolute immunity even for nonofficial acts as a result of his office. 
44. In the Arrest Warrant case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that 
there was such an immunity, see id. ¶ 54, at 22, but its opinion was conclusory without 
citing specific historical practice, and the dissent argued to the contrary. See id. ¶¶ 14– 
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little basis for finding a state consensus on immunity.  Of course, one
may say that the rationale underlying head-of-state immunity ought
to include foreign ministers, but that requires something beyond 
the identification of an existing custom.  It is a statement about how the 
current decisionmaker thinks the interests of justice and diplomacy should
be balanced,45 not about how custom has balanced them.
In the Arrest Warrant case in the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
the dissent made exactly this point.  The ICJ majority held that the Congo’s 
foreign minister had absolute customary law immunity, but its opinion 
was unclear whether it found this immunity as a matter of actual practice. 
In response, ad hoc Judge Van den Wyngaert argued, 
I disagree with the proposition that incumbent Foreign Ministers enjoy
immunities on the basis of customary international law for the simple reason 
that there is no evidence in support of this proposition.  Before reaching this
conclusion, the Court should have examined whether there is a rule of 
customary international law to this effect.  It is not sufficient to compare the
rationale for the protection from suit in the case of diplomats, Heads of State
and Foreign Ministers to draw the conclusion that there is a rule of customary 
international law protecting Foreign Ministers: identifying a common raison
d’être for a protective rule is one thing, elevating this protective rule to the 
status of customary international law is quite another thing.
 . . . .
In the present case, the Judgment of the International Court of Justice proceeds
from a mere analogy with immunities for diplomatic agents and Heads of 
State.46 
Judge Van den Wyngaert went on to stress the potential normative
differences between foreign ministers and others who had previously 
been granted immunity:
There are fundamental differences between the circumstances of diplomatic
agents, Heads of State and Foreign Ministers. The circumstances of diplomatic
agents are comparable, but not the same as those of Foreign Ministers.  Under 
the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, diplomatic agents enjoy
45. As such, it might be thought of as a proposal or suggestion for the creation of
a new rule of international law, and it would become one if states accepted it.  However, 
if the decisionmaker is (like the ICJ) authorized to apply only existing international law,
a decision would not be appropriate on this basis.  In contrast, a state might decline to
prosecute (where prosecution would otherwise be appropriate) on the basis that an
immunity should be recognized.  That would be an entirely appropriate proposal for an 
extension of custom, and other states would be free to accept or reject it.











   

















immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State.  However,
diplomats reside and exercise their functions on the territory of the receiving 
States whereas Ministers normally reside in the State where they exercise their
functions.  Receiving States may decide whether or not to accredit foreign
diplomats and may always declare them persona non grata. Consequently, 
they have a “say” in what persons they accept as a representative of the other
State. They do not have the same opportunity vis-à-vis Cabinet Ministers, who 
are appointed by their Governments as part of their sovereign prerogatives. 
Likewise, there may be an analogy between Heads of State, who probably
enjoy immunity under customary international law, and Foreign Ministers. 
But the two cannot be assimilated for the only reason that their functions may
be compared.  Both represent the State, but Foreign Ministers do not “impersonate” 
the State in the same way as Heads of State, who are the State’s alter ego.
State practice concerning immunities of (incumbent and former) Heads of 
State does not, per se, apply to Foreign Ministers.47 
Thus, head-of-state immunity appears to be an example of pure custom; 
foreign minister immunity may be (if the Arrest Warrant case’s dissent
is correct on the facts)48 an example of an extension of custom.  The former 
does not involve a contested value judgment apart from the bindingness 
of custom; it involves only a factual determination that head-of-state
immunity has been applied in normatively identical circumstances. 
The latter, if the dissent is correct, involves the additional normative
decision that the rationale underlying head-of-state immunity applies
with sufficient force to foreign ministers that foreign ministers should 
receive the same treatment, notwithstanding the plausible countervailing 
normative concerns that immunity be kept as narrow as possible and the
plausible normative differences between heads of state and resident
diplomats on one hand and foreign ministers on the other. 
At this point it may be objected that I am not describing two types of 
argument from custom but rather just describing a convincing use of
custom and an unconvincing use of custom.  I think that oversimplifies. 
Assume that in the foregoing example there is no specific history of 
foreign minister immunity.  Even so, the foreign minister’s argument, 
properly understood, is not necessarily a weak argument from custom— 
it could be a different sort of custom-based argument.  It relies on custom to
establish part, but not all, of its claim.  Custom establishes that a concern
47. Id. ¶¶ 15–16, at 146–47 (footnotes omitted).  Judge Van den Wyngaert further
argued that even if foreign ministers had some historical immunity, they should not have 
immunity for serious human rights abuses (the charge in the Arrest Warrant case was 
incitement of racial violence).  Id. ¶¶ 26–27, at 152–55. 
48. For present purposes I do not take a position on the merits of the question 
whether there is a historical immunity for foreign ministers.  My point is that the dissent 
highlights the two forms of argument: the majority might have been claiming to have 
identified a specific historical immunity or it might—as the dissent charged—have been
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for facilitating diplomatic exchanges justifies immunity in some
circumstances, despite countervailing concerns for justice.  That is the
rationale for diplomatic and head-of-state immunity.  In this description, it
would not be convincing to argue against the foreign minister that 
immunity itself is immoral as injurious to justice.  Custom recognizes a 
place for immunity.  Thus, the minister relies to some extent on custom.
But custom is not all of the argument because custom does not establish
immunity in the particular case—it may suggest it, but it does not require
it.  Thus, the minister’s argument is an argument from custom, but it is
not an argument from pure custom.  And a court accepting this argument
would be making law in common law fashion rather than simply finding
a custom.
III. FURTHER EXAMPLES: WAR POWERS AND SECONDARY LIABILITY 
To develop the argument in greater detail, this Part applies the distinction 
outlined in Part II to two contemporary debates where it may be more
controversial: presidential war powers and secondary liability for human
rights violations. 
A. War Powers and the Libya Intervention 
In March 2011 President Obama directed U.S. airstrikes against Libyan 
government positions during an uprising against the rule of Muammar 
Qadhafi.49  The stated goal was to protect Libyan civilians, especially in 
the city of Benghazi, from attack by Qadhafi forces, although in fact the 
actions of the United States and its allies appeared to go somewhat beyond 
that, ultimately providing substantial air support for rebel fighters and
contributing to Qadhafi’s overthrow.50  Congress did not approve any aspect 
of this operation, leading to charges that the President acted in violation 
of the Constitution, specifically of the clause giving Congress power to
“declare War.”51 
49. 2011 OLC Mem., supra note 10, at 1–5. 
50. See id. at 2–3, 5; Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President on 
the Death of Muammar Qaddafi (Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/the-press-office/2011/10/20/remarks-president-death-muammar-qaddafi. 
51. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of “Empty Words”: A Comment on 




   
 
 
   
 
























In a memorandum dated April 1, 2011, the Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) defended the constitutionality of the intervention on various grounds. 
Most relevant here, the OLC memorandum invoked custom.  In particular,
the memorandum relied on 
the “historical gloss” placed on the Constitution by two centuries of practice. 
“Our history,” this office observed in 1980, “is replete with instances of 
presidential uses of military force abroad in the absence of prior congressional
approval.” . . . This historical practice is an important indication of constitutional 
meaning, because it reflects the two political branches’ practical understanding,
developed since the founding of the Republic, of their respective roles and
responsibilities with respect to national defense . . . .  In this context, the “pattern of
executive conduct, made under claim of right, extended over many decades 
and engaged in by Presidents of both parties, ‘evidences the existence of broad
constitutional power.’”52 
Elsewhere the memorandum noted OLC’s previous conclusion that the 
relationship between Congress’s declare-war power “and the President’s
authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive has been . . . 
‘clarified by 200 years of practice.’”53  Applying these observations to the
circumstances of the Libya intervention, the memorandum concluded that 
“applicable historical precedents demonstrate that the limited military 
operations the President anticipated directing were not a ‘war’ for
constitutional purposes” and thus did not require congressional approval.54 
The memorandum principally relied on four sources to establish the 
decisive “200 years of practice.”  First, Robert Jackson’s 1941 opinion 
as attorney general in Training of British Flying Students in the United 
States noted that “the President’s authority has long been recognized as 
extending to the dispatch of armed forces outside the United States, either 
on missions of good will or rescue, or for the purpose of protecting
American lives or property or American interests.”55  Second, a 1980 OLC 
memorandum, prepared in the course of the Iran hostage crisis, concluded
that the President had independent authority to rescue the hostages and
retaliate against Iran.56  Third, the Congressional Research Service’s
compilation Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad
52. See 2011 OLC Mem., supra note 10, at 7 (citations omitted); see also Bradley
& Morrison, supra note 1, at 461–68 (discussing the memorandum’s appeals to custom). 
53. 2011 OLC Mem., supra note 10, at 7 (quoting Proposed Deployment of
United States Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19 Op. O.L.C. 327, 330–31 (1995)). 
54. Id. at 13. 
55. Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 58, 
62 (1941), quoted in 2011 OLC Mem., supra note 10, at 7.
56. Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory
Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 185–87 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 OLC Mem.], quoted
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contains numerous examples of such use without congressional approval.57 
Finally, additional OLC memoranda in 1992, 1994, and 1995 (regarding 
actions in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, respectively) contain general
language about the President’s longstanding independent ability to use 
force abroad.58 
Notably, the 2011 memorandum did not argue that any of the historical 
uses of force mentioned by these sources closely resembled the Libya 
intervention.59  Had it wanted specific historical support, some might
have been available. It is true that early post-ratification precedent points
sharply in the other direction.  The 1798 “quasi-war” with France and the 
naval actions against the Barbary powers under Presidents Jefferson and 
Madison, examples of limited force directed against foreign sovereign 
powers, have close parallels with the Libya intervention.  In both cases,
broad contemporaneous consensus held that Congress had to authorize
them (with the partial exception of Tripoli in 1801, where a declaration
of war had already been made by the other side).60  But beginning in the
early twentieth century, presidents used limited force without congressional
authorization against weak nations in the Americas to bring about the 
overthrow of unfriendly regimes.  At minimum, one might count Theodore
Roosevelt’s actions to support Panama’s secession from Colombia,61 
Woodrow Wilson’s interventions in Haiti and Mexico, and various 
interventions in Nicaragua.62 As with Libya, these interventions were based 
57. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41677, INSTANCES OF 
USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798–2010 (2011), cited in 2011 OLC 
Mem., supra note 10, at 7.
58. See 2011 OLC Mem., supra note 10, at 6–7. 
59. See id.  The memorandum did discuss the proposed Haiti intervention in 1994
and the bombing of Serbia in 1999, which have important parallels to the Libya 
intervention, but those recent events do not support the idea of “200 years” of “historical 
gloss.” See id. at 6–11. 
60. See  DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST 
PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 239–44 (1997); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:
THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829, at 123–29 (2001).  For a discussion of the constitutional 
implications of the Tripoli events, see RAMSEY, supra note 21, at 244–45. 
61. See  DAVID MCCULLOUGH, THE PATH BETWEEN THE SEAS: THE CREATION OF 
THE PANAMA CANAL, 1870–1914, at 361–86 (1977). In 1903, U.S. forces, without 
congressional approval, intervened against the Colombian military to assure the success 
of the independence movement in Panama (then part of Colombia).  LOUIS FISHER, 
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 59–60 (2d ed. rev. 2004).  This action was undertaken to 
secure a route for constructing the Panama Canal, not in response to an attack on the 
United States or to protect American lives or property. Id.



















   








loosely on U.S. national interests but did not involve rescues or responses to
attacks.
These episodes carry more than a whiff of U.S. imperialism, making 
reliance on them possibly distasteful for the Obama Administration, and 
perhaps they are not sufficient to establish a specific custom supporting
the Libya intervention in any event.  Among other things, at least some 
of them were regarded in their time as exceeding the President’s 
constitutional power.63  The central point here, however, is that the 2011 
OLC memorandum did not attempt to find reasonably close historical
analogies, even though some may have been available. 
Rather, the memorandum’s argument developed in a different manner. 
To it, the whole historical array of presidential uses of force—some
concededly quite distinct factually and normatively from the Libya
intervention—established a broader proposition that the President could 
use force abroad without congressional authorization. The memorandum 
then identified one limit on this power—the President’s unilateral use of 
force could not be a “‘war’ for constitutional purposes”—but concluded 
the Libya intervention was not a “war” in this sense because it shared 
some characteristics of prior unauthorized uses: it did not involve ground 
troops, it had a “limited mission,” and it did not “aim at the conquest or 
occupation of territory.”64 
The 2011 memorandum differs in this regard from OLC’s 1980 
memorandum, which the 2011 memorandum cited.  The 1980 memorandum 
described its inquiry specifically:
We have considered the President’s existing power to employ the armed forces
in any of three distinct kinds of operations: (1) deployment abroad at some risk
of engagement . . . ; (2) a military expedition to rescue the hostages or to retaliate 
against Iran if the hostages are harmed; (3) an attempt to repel an assault that
threatens our vital interests in that region.65 
The memorandum then proceeded to analyze each question separately 
and specifically, with reference to prior practice that involved similar 
circumstances.  “Operations of rescue and retaliation,” it continued, 
“have also been ordered by the President without congressional authorization 
even when they involved hostilities.  Presidents have repeatedly employed
troops abroad in defense of American lives and property.”66  The  
memorandum then listed nine separate instances of rescue and retaliation, 
63. See FISHER, supra note 61, at 58–66; MCCULLOUGH, supra note 61, at 381–83. 
64. 2011 OLC Mem., supra note 10, at 13 (quoting Proposed Deployment of 
United States Armed Forces into Bosnia, supra note 53, at 332) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
65. 1980 OLC Mem., supra note 56, at 185–86. 
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starting with “President Jefferson’s use of the Navy to suppress the 
Barbary pirates.”67  Thus, unlike the 2011 memorandum, the 1980 
memorandum attempted to establish that the same sorts of actions had 
been done without congressional authorization in the past. 
Of course, one might simply say that the 2011 memorandum makes a 
poor case for support from custom.  My point instead is that the 2011
memorandum and the 1980 memorandum reflect two different sorts of
arguments. The 1980 memorandum is an argument from pure custom. 
It asserts that the actions the President was then contemplating (a rescue
mission) were effectively identical in their material facts to prior
actions taken by prior presidents without congressional approval (other 
rescue missions).  It was in that sense that the memorandum invoked
“constitutional practice over two centuries.”68  The 1980 memorandum’s 
argument would be defeated if one could show that prior incidents
actually presented normatively distinct circumstances from the situation 
the memorandum confronted. 
As noted above, a similar argument could have been deployed in the 
2011 memorandum, relying on the early twentieth-century interventions;
whether it would have been persuasive is another matter, but the key point
is that the 2011 memorandum did not make this argument.  Instead, the 
2011 memorandum is an argument for extending custom by attempting
to abstract a general principle from prior practice and then apply the
general principle to a new set of normatively distinct circumstances. For
the 2011 memorandum, the significant point was that presidents 
historically had used military force without authorization in a variety of
circumstances.  The memorandum did not need to establish that these 
prior uses closely resembled the Libya intervention because that was not 
part of its argument.  Its argument was that prior practice supported a 
general principle that the President could use low-level force without 
authorization and that Libya was an instance of low-level force.69  Notably,
67. Id.  As noted, the “Barbary pirates” episode is actually not a persuasive
precedent on this point. See RAMSEY, supra note 21, at 244–45. 
68. 1980 OLC Mem., supra note 56, at 187. 
69. See 2011 OLC Mem., supra note 10.  One might argue that the 2011
memorandum was asserting that all (or most) of the historical instances were the same in
their material facts as the Libya intervention.  That assertion, though, would have been 
plainly incorrect: there are substantial normative differences between the Libya
intervention and cases of the President using force unilaterally to respond to an attack, to




     
   





















   
the memorandum also used prior practice to establish a general principle 
limiting the President’s use of force: the idea of (1) engagement of ground 
forces and (2) broad, ambitious objectives.  Although the memorandum 
did not spell out the source of this limit, the thinking presumably was that
these general principles described prior situations in which authorization
had been sought (that is, the full-scale wars in which the United States 
has been involved). 
In sum, the 2011 memorandum is not an example of a poor argument 
from custom; it is simply not an example of an argument from pure
custom.  It is an example of common law reasoning to extend custom.  It
extracts a general principle from past practice and then finds the current
situation to conform, not with past practice itself but with the general
principle.  To be sure, one could extract a narrower general principle from 
past practice, such as that the President can act without authorization in an
emergency situation where lives and property are threatened.  The 
existence of a narrower principle does not defeat a common law argument, 
however. As discussed, the essence of common law reasoning, at least
as it is understood today, is a value choice among a variety of possible 
principles drawn from past practice.70 Once the 2011 memorandum is 
understood in this way, there is nothing faulty about its reasoning: it
chooses a plausible principle and offers policy reasons why this principle 
is a good one (for example, that ground troops greatly escalate the need 
for authorization because of the difficulties of withdrawal once they are 
committed). One can disagree with where it draws the line, but that is a 
disagreement rooted in value judgment, not a disagreement rooted in logic 
or history.  Put another way, unlike the 1980 memorandum, the 2011
memorandum, properly understood as a common law argument, cannot 
be defeated merely by showing that prior episodes were not materially
equivalent to the present situation. 
Nonetheless, the 2011 memorandum has a crucial weakness once it is
understood as a common law argument.  It cannot rely on consent.  Some of
its general language invokes consent, in the sense of the agreement of
the political branches upon a particular division of war power. The 
history, the memorandum asserts, “reflects the two political branches’ 
practical understanding . . . of their respective roles” in a way that supports
the memorandum’s ultimate conclusion.71 
That is not so.  For there to be a shared “practical understanding,” the 
memorandum’s conclusion would have to follow inevitably, or at least 
implicate the sovereign authority of the foreign nation. See Glennon, supra note 51, at 
3–7.  Thus, I think it is not plausible that the memorandum was making this assertion. 
70. See STRAUSS, supra note 5, at 38; supra text accompanying notes 5–6. 
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uncontroversially, from the history.  This is what the 1980 memorandum
attempted to show with respect to rescues: the President had engaged in 
exactly this action in the past, and because it was not contested at the
time, Congress (and the people) must have consented to it.72  So long as
the President’s contemplated action in 1980 was equivalent, in terms of
policy considerations, to past actions, then one can find a type of consent 
—or at least acquiescence—in the prior actions.  That is the power of an 
argument from pure custom.
But the 2011 memorandum is not an argument from pure custom.  It 
does not assert that the Libya intervention is essentially equivalent to prior 
presidential actions such that no reasonable normative judgment could
distinguish them.  Nothing in the memorandum makes that argument. By
not making that argument, however, the 2011 memorandum must
give up its claim to rest on consent.  The fact that Congress and the people
in the past may have assented to normatively different unauthorized uses 
of force by the President does not mean they assented to uses such as the
Libya intervention.  To be sure, the 2011 memorandum finds plausible
common principles uniting the Libya intervention and prior uses of force. 
But the existence of plausible common principles does not show that
other actors would necessarily choose those principles, as opposed to 
some other ones. As a result, the 2011 memorandum is an argument for
constitutional evolution; it is not an argument from consent based on 
custom because it cannot be assumed that everyone had or would have 
consented to this particular evolution.
To repeat, that does not make the 2011 memorandum an illegitimate 
argument (although Part IV will argue that it is a problematic argument 
in several respects).  It simply makes it a different kind of argument— 
one based on deploying common law reasoning to reach constitutional
decisions. In other words, it appeals not to Felix Frankfurter, despite its 
invocation of Frankfurter’s celebrated concurrence,73 but to David Strauss. 
72. I express no opinion on whether the 1980 memorandum succeeded in 
demonstrating this equivalence.  Perhaps the scale of the proposed Iranian rescue, or the 
extent of foreign sovereign involvement in opposition, distinguished it from prior episodes.
My point is that the 1980 memorandum saw itself as arguing from their equivalence. 















   





     






    
 
   
 
  
B. Secondary Investor Liability Under Customary International Law 
In various high-profile suits in U.S. court, principally under the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS),74 multinational corporations have been sued for human
rights violations committed abroad.  Typically, although not uniformly, the
human rights violations were committed by a foreign government, and
the corporate defendant, through its business operations, allegedly aided 
and abetted the government’s action.75  Because the ATS authorizes suits
“by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations,”76 a central question in these cases is whether international law 
recognizes secondary liability for business operations that have some 
indirect relationship to human rights violations by others (and if so, 
how close international law requires that relationship to be).77 
Supporters of business liability in these circumstances make two principal 
arguments. First, they argue that the post-World War II trials of Nazi
war criminals established an international custom of secondary business 
liability. In several of these trials, defendants were businessmen who had
collaborated with the Nazis—most famously, the suppliers of Zyklon B 
gas to concentration camps.78  Thus, there appears to be some direct practice
of business liability for human rights abuses.79  Second, they argue that
secondary liability for human rights violations, as a general proposition, 
has been established both by the Nazi-era trials and more recently by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).80 Typically these arguments are
combined, but in the terms outlined above, they are distinct: the first of
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
75. E.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. 
Ct. 1995 (2013) (mem.); Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 2011); Doe VIII v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. 
Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank
Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007). 
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
77. See Ramsey, supra note 13, at 275–83.  An alternative argument not considered 
here is that federal common law might impose secondary liability even if international
law does not. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 288 & n.5 (Hall, J., concurring).  I am 
concerned here only with the question whether and to what extent international law
contains a principle of secondary liability in the commercial context.  In Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court substantially
limited ATS liability on the distinct ground that the ATS does not authorize suit for 
foreign conduct that does not “touch and concern” U.S. territory.
78. See KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 93–96 (2011); Ramsey, supra note 13, at 306–07. 
79. See Keitner, supra note 15, at 91–92 (relying heavily on the Zyklon B case to 
support secondary business liability). 
80. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 270 (Katzmann, J., concurring); Keitner, supra note 
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these arguments is, at least in part, an argument from pure custom; the
second is an argument for extending custom. 
Some Nazi-era trials did appear to contemplate that business activities
could give rise to secondary criminal liability under international law.
The most famous of these is the Zyklon B case, in which several business
executives were convicted for selling Zyklon B gas to the Nazis, expressly 
for the purpose of using it for mass murder in the concentration camps.81 
In another case, a banker was prosecuted for making loans to Nazi entities.82 
Although he was acquitted, the tribunal did not wholly reject the 
proposition that business relations could give rise to international law 
liability; the acquittal turned on his lack of sufficient mental state or his
lack of substantial contribution to the crimes (or both).83  Arguably, the
decision stands for the proposition that indirect assistance to human rights
violators can under some circumstances violate international law.
To the extent modern cases contain facts substantially parallel to these 
cases, an argument for liability could rest upon pure custom.  It might 
have difficulties in proof. There are only a few such cases from the Nazi 
war crimes era, and they were not duplicated in any subsequent international 
prosecution, so one might conclude that they are too isolated to provide 
evidence of longstanding custom.  Further, the most important of them, 
the Zyklon B case, contains extreme facts84 that are unlikely to be
approximated in modern cases, and in the other principal case, the main
defendant was acquitted.85  Nonetheless, these cases provide some basis 
for an argument from pure custom because they have the possibility of 
close parallels with at least some modern claims.
In contrast, invocation of the ICTY and ICTR cases requires a different sort
of argument.  I will focus on the ICTY, although the ICTR cases are 
similar, and there are also some similar cases from the Nuremberg era.86 
The argument for corporate liability here emphasizes the fact that the 
81. Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (Zyklon B Case), reprinted in 1  U.N. 
WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93, 93–94, 102
(1947).
82. United States v. von Weizsaecker (Ministries Case), reprinted in 14 TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAW NO. 10, at 621 (1949). 
83. See id. at 622. 
84. In particular, the principal defendant apparently participated with the Nazis in
planning the specific use of the gas. See Ramsey, supra note 13, at 306–07 & n.150. 
85. See HELLER, supra note 78, at 288. 
86. See Ramsey, supra note 13, at 306 n.150. 
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ICTY has recognized secondary liability under international law for
human rights violations.87  If the ICTY decisions are evidence of custom—a
point I assume here—then that shows (it is said) that secondary liability
can attach for business operations as alleged in the ATS cases.88 
This argument skips an important step.  The ICTY prosecutions did not
involve business operations.  Rather, they typically involved joint
membership in paramilitary groups during the Yugoslavian civil war; 
human rights violations were committed by some members of the group 
with the assistance of others, and those giving assistance were successfully 
prosecuted on theories of secondary liability.  For example, in the leading 
Furundžija case, the defendant was part of a Croatian irregular military
unit operating in Bosnia and was prosecuted for complicity in a rape 
committed by another member of the unit.89  Another prominent case, 
Vasiljević, involved a paramilitary defendant who held prisoners at
gunpoint and prevented their escape while other members of the group
executed them.90 
The difficulty from the perspective of establishing custom for the ATS 
cases, however, is that ICTY prosecutions such as Furundžija and
Vasiljević reflect very different circumstances and normative considerations
from the ATS commercial liability cases.  The ICTY cases address a
fundamentally different question: they ask when one individual can
become criminally liable for the misdeeds of another individual in the 
context of war (or a war-like situation) in which the individuals involved 
are acting as part of a criminal group or operation.  Most of the key 
cases, including Furundžija and Vasiljević, involved individuals acting
together in a joint paramilitary enterprise according to a common plan to 
violate international law, with the defendants acting as direct participants 
in the offenses and sharing the broader criminal intent of the group. 
That is not at all the same question as whether a commercial operation 
should be civilly liable for the misdeeds of a host government where it 
does business, although there is surely some overlap. In particular, in 
the commercial liability situation, it is usually not the case that the business 
and the host government are partners in a joint criminal enterprise, as in
the ICTY cases (although that may sometimes be true).  Reasonable people 
87. E.g., Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 234–35
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). 
88. See Keitner, supra note 15, at 90–96. 
89. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶¶ 2, 38. 
90. Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, ¶ 1 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
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may disagree as to the moral and practical implications of the contextual
differences.91 
Further, a fundamental question in the commercial liability cases is the 
extent to which investment in abusive host regimes should be encouraged or
discouraged.  Secondary commercial liability is controversial in part
because of its uncertain effect on international economic development.
The ATS claims appear likely to have a chilling effect on foreign commerce 
and investment in developing nations.  At least in their broadest versions, 
they may require no more business wrongdoing than simply operating in 
nations whose governments commit known human rights abuses. Even 
if some further wrongdoing is required, it is hard to know in advance 
what acts would trigger liability or insulate a business operation from it. 
As a result, if secondary commercial liability becomes widely recognized, 
the perceived costs and risks of developing-world venture may rise and
such investment may be substantially deterred.92  Of course, one response is
that operations in nations with abusive regimes should be deterred as a 
means of undermining them or encouraging them to change their approach.
But there is substantial debate over the best way to encourage abusive
governments to reform, with various strategies being endorsed or enacted
for various specific regimes.  Among other things, one might wish to
encourage (or at least not discourage) foreign investment in developing
nations, even where the host government has a poor human rights record. 
On some theories of development, increases in national wealth reduce
human rights abuses, and some theories of international relations hold 
that calibrated withholding of investment can improve an abusive 
environment.93 
No parallel considerations exist with respect to the rogue paramilitaries at
issue in cases like Vasiljević and Furundžija.  Thus, one might readily
believe that criminal secondary liability is appropriate in the context of 
paramilitary groups but not support an extension to civil liability for 
normal business relationships with abusive governments.  As a result, 
ICTY-derived custom provides partial but not complete support for
91. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 333–36 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Korman, J., concurring). 
92. See Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien
Tort Statute and Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161, 2200–01 (2012);
Alan O. Sykes, Transnational Forum Shopping as a Trade and Investment Issue, 37 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 339, 370–73 (2008). 



















    
 
secondary business liability for human rights violations.  ICTY practice 
may show that, as a matter of custom, secondary liability is sometimes
appropriate. But it does not show that custom has embraced secondary 
liability in the context of business operations because that context was 
not at issue in the ICTY prosecutions and the situations are not normatively
equivalent. An ICTY-based argument requires the additional step of
concluding that secondary liability should be extended from the paramilitary 
war crimes context to the business context and from criminal to civil 
trials. Of course, many people think it should be extended.  But that is a 
normative conclusion, not a result derived from custom.
In sum, there are two ways to use custom to argue for secondary 
corporate liability in the international human rights context.  The first
approach is to show that particular types of business involvement in 
rights violations have given rise to secondary international law liability
in the past. The difficulty with this argument is its factual basis—there
appear to be few such examples.  But conceptually, it fits well with the 
idea of argument from pure custom.  The second approach is to show 
that secondary liability for rights violations has been recognized in other 
contexts, principally by the ICTY and the ICTR, and argue for its 
extension to business liability.  This second approach, however, is not an 
argument from pure custom because the contexts are potentially 
normatively distinct: it is plausible although not inevitable that a reasonable
observer would find normatively significant differences.  Like the
arguments surveyed above, it relies on custom for part but not all of its 
propositions.94 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The foregoing Parts have presented what is intended as a descriptive 
assessment of arguments from custom.  To restate, they argue for a fairly 
simple proposition: some arguments rest on pure custom (that is, the use 
of prior practices to generate law for normatively indistinguishable 
future practices); others involve extensions of custom (that is, the use of 
prior practices plus normative analogies to generate law for new 
situations). This Part turns to the implications of this distinction. 
Whether this distinction matters depends substantially upon the source 
of authority on which a law is said to rest. As suggested at the outset, the 
distinction appears not to matter greatly in a common law regime because 
modern common law accepts a judge’s authority to make common law rules
94. For present purposes I express no opinion on whether either of these arguments is 
persuasive; I have argued elsewhere that they are not, see id. at 303–20, but nothing argued
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for a new situation based on a combination of analogies to past practices
and normative arguments for extensions.95 
For constitutional law, the implications are mixed because constitutional 
law is more conflicted as to the theoretical source of its legitimacy.  Pure 
originalists might equally reject both versions of custom as generative of 
constitutional law (or at least as generative of law that overrides the original
meaning of the Constitution’s text).  Theorists such as David Strauss 
have argued for the legitimacy of common law reasoning in constitutional
law and thus would accept the legitimacy of both.96  However, it is likely 
that there is a substantial middle ground that would accept pure custom 
as a basis of constitutional law but would not accept normative extensions 
of custom.  Justice Frankfurter’s claim of historical gloss97 is a powerful 
one, especially within a system that also recognizes judicial precedent. 
Custom-based arguments can draw substantial authority from the twin
ideas of past consensus as a form of consent and the expectations-based
hesitation to deviate from settled practice.98  They may also seem more
suited for the judicial role in a constitutional system because they do not 
involve judicial value judgments (aside from the acceptance of custom
as law-generating).
It is important to recognize, however, that past consensus and
expectations have full force only with respect to arguments from pure 
custom.  Arguments for extension of custom cannot rest on consent or 
acquiescence because it cannot be established beyond mere speculation 
whether the past consensus, observable with respect to certain practices,
would have extended to other normatively distinct practices if the question 
had presented itself.99  Similarly, expectations-based concerns are not
implicated because there is no uniform expectation of how and whether 
the custom would be extended.  Moreover, arguments for the extension
of custom do rely on situation-specific value judgments.  As Strauss
95. See STRAUSS, supra note 5, at 38–39. 
96. Id. 
97. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
98. See generally Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1 (assessing variations of this 
position). 
99. This point is important because some extensions-of-custom arguments wrongly
rely on past consensus and expectations. As discussed above, OLC’s defense of the 
Libya intervention makes this error: it invokes Justice Frankfurter’s use of custom as 
well as the idea that practice indicates a settled political branch agreement on the 

















   






    
 
    
   
 
  
acknowledges, in common law constitutional analysis, the decision whether 
or not to extend a precedent is to a significant extent a policy decision. 
That raises the difficult issue of authority to override the Constitution’s 
text on the basis of contemporary value judgments. 
In sum, there is a fundamental difference between Frankfurter’s pure 
custom and Strauss’s constitutional common law, based on the need in 
the latter but not the former for contested situation-specific value judgments. 
That is not to say that arguments for extensions of custom in constitutional
law are illegitimate, but they require a different sort of theoretical
justification than can be invoked for arguments for pure custom.  The 
two should not be conflated.
The implications for international law are more fundamental, on at 
least two grounds.  The first concerns the theoretical foundation of
international law, while the second concerns its democratic legitimacy.
Customary international law traditionally grounds its legitimacy 
in consent.100 This of course was not always the case: in the eighteenth 
century and before, international law was frequently regarded as a form
of natural law, deducible by reason.101 But the waning of natural law
theories of obligation generally and specific doubts about international 
law associated most pointedly with the nineteenth-century writings of 
John Austin forced international law to seek an alternate foundation. Austin 
argued that international “law” was not truly law because it lacked, among 
other things, a supreme sovereign lawmaking power; its supposed
obligations, therefore, represented only “[i]nternational [m]orality.”102  That
was consistent with the broader nineteenth-century move from naturalism to
positivism as a description of law; natural law came to be seen more as 
an expression of morality, debatable and lacking authoritative expression— 
100. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 8. International law’s reliance on consent has 
been criticized. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 8, at 790 (arguing that “[t]he overcommitment 
to state control over events creates a suffocating status quo bias that does more harm 
than good” and proposing that “from where we are today, it is imperative that we move
toward a system in which there is more rather than less nonconsensual rule-making”).  It 
may also be overstated: particularly after World War II, important aspects of international
law emerged—especially in the human rights field—that may owe more to naturalist 
than positivist bases.  See BEDERMAN, supra note 8, at 8–10; MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, 
THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 8–9 & n.41 (2008) (arguing that 
“international law scholars have never wholly rejected natural law theory” and that “there is 
much about international law that transcends the material, positive acts such as consent”). 
As noted elsewhere, to the extent international law does not rely on consent or some related
version of state practices, it does not depend on custom and thus is outside the scope of 
this Article (but it also is subject to greater uncertainty as to its legitimacy).
101. RAMSEY, supra note 21, at 344–46. 
102. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 127, 207– 
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in contrast to sovereign rules (often written rules) that formed the basis
of “real” law.103 
International law’s response was to emphasize sovereign consent.
Eighteenth-century writing had acknowledged sovereign consent as a 
basis for international law but generally regarded it as less important than
natural law bases.104  Under pressure from Austin and others, consent 
came to the forefront because it offered a partial response.  Austin
overreached in thinking that there had to be a single sovereign lawmaker:
law could be created by agreement, including implicit agreement; rules 
for sovereigns could be created by sovereign consent; and implicit agreement
could be shown from sovereigns’ customary practices.  Austin’s charge
that international law lacked a sovereign lawmaker was answered by
saying that it was made by all sovereigns collectively; his charge that it
had no existence beyond the particular version of morality espoused by
any given interpreter was answered by saying that it could be found not
in contested conceptions of right and wrong but in the (factual) longstanding
practices of nations. Thus, what was called the “law of nations” in the 
eighteenth century became “customary international law” in the nineteenth 
century.105 
Pure custom, however, has drawbacks as a basis of law among nations. It
is hard to generalize and hard to apply to new circumstances or new
issues. Strict adherence to it as a basis for law is likely to lead to the
conclusion that large areas of international relations are not governed by
international law at all because no conclusive custom can be identified.106  As
a result, there is pressure to adopt what this Article has called arguments 
for extension of custom.  If international courts and international lawyers 
can use analogies and appeals to abstract principles to generate rules, 
international law’s coverage will be more complete and more able 
to provide answers to new issues.  Thus, particularly in the twentieth 
century and continuing to the modern era, this form of argumentation
103. BEDERMAN, supra note 8, at 5–8
 104. See, e.g., VATTEL, supra note 39, at 75–76, 77–78. 
105. See David J. Bederman, Customary International Law in the Supreme Court, 
1861–1900, in  INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE 89, 91–112 (2011).  This summary oversimplifies a number of points not relevant to
the present discussion, including the question whether consent had to come from all nations or
merely from an overwhelming number.  As elsewhere, I use consent to potentially include 
acquiescence and without addressing what is necessary to manifest consent. 
106. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Empirical Dilemma of International Law, 41 SAN 






















   
    




   
 
 
      
  
 
       
      
  
   
 
  
has become increasingly common.107  Though it retains the title
“[c]ustomary international law,” it is something more than “a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them [out of] a sense of
legal obligation.”108  Instead, in this way international law acquires
attributes of common law, akin to the constitutional common law prescribed
by David Strauss.  International lawyers, commentators, and judges use
their own situation-specific value judgments to fill in the considerable 
gaps in pure custom. 
The difficulty is that, unlike arguments from pure custom, this type of 
“customary” law cannot rest on sovereign consent. When a rule is said
to arise from an extension of custom, rather than from custom itself, we
do not know whether sovereigns generally would consent to that extension.
As discussed above, these situations involve contested value judgments
external to the general idea of binding custom.  And because they are
contested, any suggestion that the consensus of sovereigns would support
the intuition of any particular decisionmaker in any particular situation is 
no more than speculation.109  But if “international common law” does
not rest on sovereign consent, it needs a different response to Austin’s
challenge, and it is not clear what that response can be. As a result, the 
distinction between arguments from pure custom and arguments for
extension of custom is critical to the theoretical viability of international
law claims.110 
The distinction is important to international law’s legitimacy in another 
respect.  A practical criticism of customary international law is that it is 
107. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS 402–04 (2002) 
(discussing the work of Hersch Lauterpacht).
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987).
109. For a discussion of this point in the context of secondary corporate liability, 
see Ramsey, supra note 13, at 314 (footnote omitted): 
If the question is what nations have tacitly adopted through their conduct with
respect to indirect investor liability, the only sound approach is to investigate 
what nations have actually done with respect to investor liability.  Other approaches
are mere speculation as to what rule nations might adopt.  To be sure, if we can
establish what nations have done (and thus tacitly agreed to do) with respect to
individuals’ responsibility for war crimes of other associated individuals . . . we can
speculate that nations might think (a) that generally applicable principles could 
be derived from that practice; and (b) that those abstract principles would apply to
investor liability in a particular way.  But until we see nations actually apply these 
principles, we can make no more than a guess. 
As noted, arguments for extending custom are wholly legitimate as proposals for creation of
new law.  If accepted by states, they can become custom. But in themselves they are not
custom until actually followed.
110. To be clear, my argument here is not that international law claims not directly
based on custom are illegitimate—only that establishing their legitimacy is more difficult 
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unclear why a particular society—especially a society based on democratic 
values—should follow it. It arises outside of the society, without assurance
that it reflects the society’s values. For a democratic society such as the
United States, that concern is compounded by the lack of democracy at 
the international level.  Many countries that participate in the formation
of international law are not internally democratic. Most persons and
entities that participate in expounding international law, in organizations 
such as the United Nations, international courts, and international legal
elites, are not democratically accountable—certainly not to the people of 
the United States and generally not to any popular body.  As a result, it 
is said, we should have very serious reservations about the content of
international law.111 
A response to these objections is that if international law arises from
sovereign consent, then it depends on the consent of the United States,
usually through the actions of the democratically accountable President. 
It also depends on the consent of other democratic societies that generally 
share U.S. values. Thus, the traditional account of international law 
provides substantial assurance that international law will not diverge too 
greatly from democratic values or from the values of any of the
societies—the United States included—that participate in its formation.
International law will be a common way of solving common problems,112 
but by definition cannot be too great a threat to any society’s sovereignty 
or values. Customary international law is in this respect much like the 
other core source of international law: treaties.  Like customary international 
law, treaties are sometimes criticized as threats to sovereignty and 
democracy, but that critique lacks compelling foundation.  Any treaty
rule that binds the United States does so because of decisions of
democratically accountable U.S. actors and thus has as much claim to
111. E.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and International Human
Rights Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 1741 (2009) (“International law is often enacted
through the influence of nondemocratic governments and unaccountable, unrepresentative
elites from democratic states.  Even the assent of democratic governments to international
human rights norms is often ‘cheap talk,’ because that assent does not reflect a willingness to
have these norms directly enforced. . . . One of the key structural problems is that the 
institutions interpreting such norms are not democratic, but bureaucratic and oligarchic and,
thus, often hostile to basic economic and personal liberties.”); see also John O. McGinnis 
& Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 
1193–1223 (2007) (discussing international law’s “democracy deficit”). 
112. See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL




















   
   
      





     
reflecting social values as ordinary legislation.  Customary international 
law, though somewhat more opaque and contested than treaties, should 
be able to offer similar assurances.
That is true, however, only to the extent that customary international 
law rests on sovereign consent.  And as this Article has argued, there are 
two forms of customary arguments, only one of which actually rests on 
sovereign consent.  International law that rests on extensions of custom
does not depend on sovereign consent and so lacks these assurances.  Thus, 
the democracy critique has much greater force applied to arguments for 
extension of custom. 
In sum, international law’s custom-based response to Austin’s critique 
works only to the extent international law arguments are based on pure 
custom.  To be sure, that observation does not necessarily render
international law based on extensions of custom illegitimate. But the 
latter should be understood as international common law, not—despite 
its name—customary international law.  And substantial legitimacy issues 
remain for it to address. 
V. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that we should recognize two types of custom-
based legal arguments.  The first, which I have called “pure custom,”
depends only on a showing that certain practices have been adopted in
the past and a general normative conclusion that past practices can
generate legal rules for equivalent present circumstances.  The emphasis
here is that the past practices involve circumstances that are not 
normatively distinct—or rather, are not arguably normative distinct—from
the present circumstances.  The argument may involve contested views 
of historical facts and contested views of whether, in general, past 
practice should have such legal force, but it does not require the
decisionmaker to undertake specific value judgments.  The second type of 
argument, which I have called “extensions of custom,” involves the 
additional contention that practices established for one set of circumstances
should be extended to a different set. That question, in contrast, 
necessarily involves a value judgment by the decisionmaker. Thus,
although it rests in part on custom, it does not proceed from custom alone. 
It is, rather, a form of common law lawmaking. 
This Article’s purpose is principally descriptive, but several conclusions
seem to follow from it.  The first is that the two types of arguments— 
often conflated in the description “arguments from custom”—should 
be assessed separately.  That is so because normative arguments available
to support one type of argument are not available to support the other. 
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expectations; arguments for the extension of custom cannot. Because 
arguments for the extension of custom involve situation-specific value 
judgments, one cannot be confident that prior decisionmakers, when
establishing the custom, would have endorsed its extension to other
arguably distinct circumstances.  Nor can one be confident that settled
expectations would anticipate an extension. Rhetorically it may be useful to
conflate the two arguments to give the second the benefits of the first, 
but that move should not be persuasive once we are attentive to the 
distinctions between them.
A second and related conclusion is that custom alone has a much 
narrower scope than may often be imagined.  Many claims that rhetorically
proceed as customary arguments in fact combine custom with external
value judgments in the nature of modern common law.  As this Article
explains, arguments from pure custom can succeed only where there is
no plausible normative difference between the past practice and the current 
circumstances.  But that condition may be relatively rare, especially in 
areas of rapid development or substantial controversy.  Arguments from 
pure custom are not often useful in providing legal solutions to new 
problems. 
A third implication is that arguments for extensions of custom have a 
firmer normative grounding in constitutional law than in international 
law. David Strauss’s recent work caps a line of scholarship developing 
the theoretical legitimacy of constitutional common law—in effect a system 
built on arguments for extensions of custom.  In contrast, international 
law tends to remain rhetorically and theoretically linked to the idea of 
pure custom, resting as it does on sovereign consent.  Although international 
law may in practice be adopting a common law-like system in many
respects, that system as yet lacks widely accepted theoretical and practical
justification.  Recognizing the difference between arguments from pure 
custom and arguments from extensions of custom will help to separate 
international law arguments with firm theoretical grounding from those 
whose status may be more in doubt.
903
 904
